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Abstract 
Cash transfer programs have become extremely popular in the developing world. There is a large 
literature on the effects of these programs on schooling, health and nutrition, but relatively little is 
known about possible impacts on child development. This paper analyzes the impact of a cash 
transfer program on cognitive development in early childhood in rural Nicaragua. Identification is 
based on random assignment. We show that children in households assigned to receive benefits had 
significantly higher levels of development nine months after the program began. There is no fade-
out of program effects two years after the program had ended and transfers were discontinued. We 
show that the changes in child development we observe are unlikely to be a result of the cash 
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1.  Introduction 
Development in early childhood is an important predictor of success throughout life. In 
developed countries, children with low levels of cognitive development before they enter school 
have lower school achievement and earn lower wages (Currie and Thomas 2001; Case and Paxson 
2008). In developing countries, low levels of cognitive development have been tied to poor 
performance in school in a number of settings (see Grantham-McGregor et al. 2007 for a review).  
Evidence from the medical and economic literature suggests that outcomes in early 
childhood are malleable (Heckman 2006; Knudsen et al. 2006). Randomized trials in the US show 
that children who benefited from intensive preschool interventions have higher school attainment, 
better test scores, lower rates of criminality, and earn higher wages in adulthood (Currie 2001; 
Schweinhart 2005), although the impacts appear to be concentrated among girls (Anderson 2008). A 
well-known study from Jamaica shows that children randomly assigned to receive home-based early 
stimulation have substantial improvements in cognitive development and subsequent school 
performance (Grantham-McGregor et al. 1991 and 1997; Walker et al. 2000; Powell et al. 2004). 
Non-experimental evidence suggests that preschool attendance is associated with better school 
performance in Argentina (Berlinski et al. 2009) and Uruguay (Berlinski et al. 2008). There is also a 
large literature documenting the impacts of nutritional supplementation programs, including 
substantial evidence from randomized control trials (see Walker et al. 2007 for a review). In 
Guatemala, children exposed to a nutritional intervention have better reading comprehension and 
perform better on tests of cognitive development in adulthood, and earn higher wages (Maluccio et 
al. 2009; Hoddinott et al. 2008).  
A reasonable amount of evidence is therefore available on how the cognitive development of 
young children responds to supply-side interventions, including access to preschool, or food 
supplementation programs. Much less is known about interventions that attempt to directly affect   3 
the investments parents make in child development—either by relieving financial constraints, or by 
changing how resources are allocated within households.  
This paper analyzes the impact of a cash transfer program on development in early 
childhood. The program, known as Atención a Crisis, made sizeable payments to poor households 
in rural areas in Nicaragua. There are a variety of reasons why one might expect a program like 
Atención a Crisis to improve development in early childhood. Children in better-off households 
generally have higher levels of development than those in poorer households in developing 
countries.
1 These associations may not be causal—rather, they may reflect a correlation between 
child development and parental wealth, parental behavior, or genetic endowments. However, if cash 
transfers like those made by Atención a Crisis allow households to spend more on nutritious foods, 
early stimulation, or health care, this may result in improvements in child development.  
There are other features of the Atención a Crisis program that could result in improvements 
in child development. Beneficiaries were told that transfers were intended to improve the diversity 
and nutrient content of children’s diets and to buy school material. The social marketing of the 
program may have transmitted knowledge about child-rearing practices; it may also have affected 
how transfer income was used through a flypaper or labeling effect.
2 Such changes in behaviors 
could be further enhanced through social interactions with other program beneficiaries and peer 
pressure (Macours and Vakis 2009). Finally, Atención a Crisis transfers were made to women, and 
income controlled by women may be spent in a way that benefits children more than income that is 
controlled by men.
3   
                                                 
1 References include Paxson and Schady (2007) and Schady (2011) on Ecuador; Halpern et al. (1996) on Brazil; 
Ghuman et al. (2005) on the Philippines; see also Schady (2006) for a discussion. 
2 See Thaler (1999) for a general discussion. Fraker et al. (1995) presents evidence for the US, although these results 
have been challenged by Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2009). See also Kooreman (2000) for the Netherlands, Jacoby 
(2002) for the Philippines, and Islam and Hoddinott (2008) for Guatemala. Edmonds (2002) finds no evidence of 
labeling effects for child benefit income in Slovenia. 
3 For example, Thomas (1994), Hoddinott and Haddad (1995), Doss (2006), and Schady and Rosero (2008) show that 
income controlled by women is associated with higher expenditures on food. Macours and Vakis (2010) show non-  4 
A large number of studies have assessed the impact of cash transfers, conditional and 
unconditional, on health status, nutrition, and education.
4 In contrast, we are aware of only two 
earlier papers on the impact of cash transfers on child development in developing countries. Fernald 
et al. (2008) suggest that larger transfers made by the PROGRESA program in Mexico resulted in 
better nutritional status, improved motor skills, and higher levels of cognitive development. 
However, the variation in the amount of cash that is used to identify these effects may be 
endogenous (Attanasio et al. 2010). Paxson and Schady (2010) use random assignment in the roll-
out of the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) cash transfer program in Ecuador to analyze the 
effects on health and development of children between 3 and 6 years of age. They show that cash 
transfers resulted in an improvement of about 0.18 standard deviations in development among the 
poorest quartile of children in their sample, with no effects among somewhat less poor children. 
Our analysis adds to the existing literature in a number of important ways. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first paper on the impact of cash transfers on child development in a 
developing country that uses data spanning the period before, during, and after the program ended. 
We show that children in households that were randomized into the Atención a Crisis program had 
significantly higher levels of development nine months after households started receiving transfers. 
Program effects of a similar magnitude are still apparent two years after Atención a Crisis had been 
discontinued and transfers had ended. Thus, there appears to be no fade-out of treatment effects 
among beneficiaries of the Atención a Crisis program, at least over the period covered in our study. 
This stands in contrast with the results from evaluations of a number of preschool programs in the 
United States (see Currie and Thomas 2000, and Garces, Thomas and Currie 2002 on Head Start, 
                                                                                                                                                                 
experimental evidence on the positive impact of mother’s seasonal migration on children’s cognitive development that 
is consistent with this hypothesis. Lundberg et al. (1997) and Ward-Batts (2008) present quasi-experimental evidence 
from the United Kingdom to argue that income controlled by women is more likely to be spent on clothing for women 
and children than income controlled by men. 
4 The literature is extensive—see Fiszbein and Schady (2009) for a review. Maluccio and Flores (2005) look at the 
effects of an earlier cash transfer program in Nicaragua.   5 
and Heckman et al. 2010 on the Perry Preschool Program), the results of a randomized evaluation of 
a food supplementation program in Jamaica (Walker et al. 2000, 2005), and the results of the 
evaluation of PROGRESA on child height (Neufeld et al. 2005, and the discussion in Fiszbein and 
Schady 2009, pp. 148-50). On the other hand, a parenting program in Jamaica appeared to 
sustainably change behaviors, and there was no fade-out of program effects on child development 
(Walker et al. 2000, 2005). 
Another important contribution of this paper is that it analyzes the extent to which changes 
in child development can be explained solely by the cash component of the Atención a Crisis 
program. We provide two pieces of evidence that strongly suggest that this is unlikely. First, the 
Atención a Crisis program randomly assigned a group of households to a variant of the basic 
treatment that included a substantially larger cash transfer. Relative to households in the basic 
treatment group, households that received the larger cash transfer had higher expenditure levels 
during and (in particular) after the program, but they did not have better child development 
outcomes.  
Second, we analyze changes in a number of intermediate inputs into the production of child 
development, including the consumption of food, early stimulation, and the utilization of preventive 
health services. The changes in the use of these inputs among treated households, which persisted 
even after the program had ended, are inconsistent with a simple story of higher overall expenditure 
levels among Atención a Crisis beneficiaries. Hence, other program features, such as the social 
marketing that accompanied the transfers, or the fact that transfers were made to women, or both, 
are likely to be important in explaining the changes in child development we observe. In sum, then, 
our paper goes beyond Fernald et al. (2008) and Paxson and Schady (2010) in analyzing impacts 
during and after the intervention, in showing that the impact is due not just to the cash transfer, and 
in establishing impact on intermediate inputs, indicating the plausible underlying mechanisms.    6 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we describe the Atención a Crisis 
pilot program, and the data, in particular the measures of cognitive development. Section 3 
discusses methods. We present results in section 4. Specifically, section 4a presents the main 
results, 4b considers differences between variations of the treatment received by different 
households, and 4c presents evidence on the change in the use of various inputs into child 
development by Atención a Crisis beneficiaries. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.   Program design, data, identification, and early childhood development outcomes 
A.   The “Atención a Crisis” pilot program 
The Atención a Crisis pilot program was implemented between November 2005 and 
December 2006 by the Ministry of the Family in 6 municipalities in rural Nicaragua. We provide a 
detailed description of the program in Appendix 1. The program included a careful evaluation based 
on random assignment. Randomization was conducted as follows. First, among all communities in 
the 6 municipalities, 56 intervention and 50 control communities were randomly selected through a 
lottery. Second, baseline data were collected in both treatment and control communities. These data 
were used to define program eligibility based on a proxy means test. Around 10 percent of 
households (and only 5 percent of households with children under 6 years of age) in treatment and 
control communities were ineligible for the program because their estimated baseline expenditures, 
as determined by the proxy means, was above the pre-defined threshold. This process resulted in the 
identification of 3,002 households to participate in the program. A further 3.7 percent of households 
that had originally been deemed eligible by the proxy means were reclassified as ineligible after a 
process of consultation with community leaders, and a corresponding 3.7 percent that had originally 
been deemed ineligible were reclassified as eligible. To avoid any possibility of selection bias from 
these choices, we use the original eligibility as the intent-to-treat.    7 
In communities randomly selected to participate in the Atención a Crisis program, the 
primary child caregiver (known as the “titular”), who in the vast majority of cases was a woman, 
was invited to a registration assembly where the program objectives and various components were 
explained. At the end of the assembly, a lottery took place in each community. Participation in the 
assemblies and lotteries was close to 100 percent. On the basis of this lottery, all eligible households 
within each community were assigned to one of three treatments.   
Households in Group 1 were offered a cash transfer, paid to the “titular” every 2 months. 
For households with children ages 0-5 this transfer was in principle conditional on regular 
preventive health check-ups. However, in practice, this conditionality was not monitored, and 
households were not penalized for non-compliance. Households with children between 7 and 15 
years old who had not finished primary school received an additional educational transfer, 
conditional on the school enrollment and regular attendance of those children. The education 
conditionality was monitored in practice. The basic Atención a Crisis intervention was modeled 
after an earlier CCT program in Nicaragua, the Red de Protección Social (RPS).
5 On average, 
transfers made to this group represented 15 percent of per capita expenditures of the average 
recipient household in our sample over the year in which it was implemented.
6 We refer to this 
treatment as the basic treatment. 
Households in Group 2 received a cash transfer that was identical to that received by 
households in Group 1. In addition, they were offered a scholarship that allowed one of the 
household members to choose among a number of vocational training courses offered at the 
municipal headquarters. These household members also participated in labor market and business-
                                                 
5 See Maluccio and Flores (2005) for the impacts on education, health and nutrition of the RPS program. 
6 Households received a transfer of US $ 145 if they had no children or only children younger than 7. In addition, 
households with children between 7 and 15 enrolled in primary school received US $ 90 per household, and a further 
US $ 25 per child.    8 
skill training workshops organized in their own communities. We refer to this treatment as the 
training package. 
Households in Group 3 received a cash transfer that was identical to that received by 
households in Group 1. In addition, they were offered a lump-sum payment to start a small non-
agricultural activity. This lump-sum was conditional on the household developing a business 
development plan. It was paid out between the end of May and September 2006.
7 The value of the 
lump-sum payment represented approximately 11 percent of per capita expenditures of the average 
recipient household over the year in which it was implemented. A household in Group 3 therefore 
was eligible for transfers equivalent to approximately 26 percent of annual expenditures. We refer 
to this treatment as the lump-sum payment package. 
In addition, all beneficiaries of the Atención a Crisis program, regardless of the treatment 
they were assigned to, were exposed to repeated information and communication efforts by program 
staff during enrollment and pay-days. These stressed the importance of varied diets, health, and 
education, and were meant to change household investment and consumption patterns. Beneficiaries 
were also expected to attend regular meetings with local program promoters to talk about the 
objectives and conditionalities of the program. 
Program take-up was high. More than 95 percent of all households randomized into the three 
treatment groups signed up for the program and took up the basic cash transfer.
8 A small fraction of 
those households, less than 5 percent, did not collect the full amount of the transfer they were 
eligible for because they had not complied with the school enrollment and attendance requirements. 
Take-up of the additional benefits offered to groups 2 and 3 was also high—89 percent for the 
                                                 
7 Households received US $ 175 at the end of May, and an additional US $ 25 in September, conditional on having 
started the nonagricultural activity that was planned. 
8 The main reason households did not take-up the program was the fact that some originally eligible households were 
deemed ineligible by local leaders after the initial assignment—see above. A small number of households had also 
migrated out of the communities after baseline. In order to avoid any selection bias, we treat all of these households as 
eligible.   9 
vocational training courses, and close to 100 percent for the lump-sum payment.
9 Contamination of 
the control group was negligible (one household).  
 
B.   Data 
Baseline data for the evaluation were collected in April-May 2005. A first follow-up survey 
was collected in July-August 2006, nine months after the households had started receiving 
payments. The sample includes the 3,002 eligible households in the treatment group, and a random 
sample of 1,019 eligible households in the communities that were assigned to the control group. A 
second follow-up survey, covering the same households as those included in the first follow-up, was 
collected between August 2008 and May 2009 (henceforth referred to as 2008). At this point, 
households had stopped receiving transfers for an average of two years.  
Attrition over the study period was minimal, less than 1.3 percent in 2006 and 2.4 percent in 
2008. Attrition is uncorrelated with treatment status, and does not differ across treatment packages. 
The baseline characteristics of the full sample of households and those that could be located at 
follow-up are very similar. We further discuss possible concerns regarding attrition and missing test 
data in Appendix 2.  
All three surveys included comprehensive information on household socioeconomic status, 
including detailed expenditure modules,
10 extensive information on child health and nutrition, 
including child height and weight, and one measure of child cognitive development, the TVIP. The 
TVIP is the Spanish-speaking version of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT), a test of 
receptive vocabulary that can be applied to children 36 months and older (Dunn et al. 1986).  
                                                 
9 About 10 percent of the business development plans were initially turned down by the Ministry of the Family, which 
oversaw the program. These proposals were sent back to the households and virtually all of them developed a new plan, 
with the help of technical assistance (the few exceptions being households that had migrated out). 
10 These modules were taken from the 2001 Nicaragua Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) survey. The 
expenditure module includes detailed information on various expenditure categories. For example, food expenditures 
include questions about 63 food items, and includes actual expenditures, home production, and food consumed outside 
the home.   10 
Both follow-up surveys included a large number of tests to assess child development. 
Social-personal, language, fine motor, and gross motor skills for all children were assessed using 
the four sub-scales of the Denver Developmental Screening Test (Frankenberg and Dodds 1996). 
The Denver can be applied to children as young as one month of age. A slightly modified version of 
the Denver is used for child monitoring by the national early childhood stimulation program in 
Nicaragua, which suggests that the test is appropriate for the population we study.  
For children age 36 months and older we applied five additional tests. The first of these is 
the TVIP, described above. We also use a short-term memory test from the McCarthy test battery, 
and a test of associative memory, drawn from the Woodcock-Johnson-Muñoz battery of cognitive 
abilities (Woodcock and Muñoz 1996; Schrank 2006; Schrank et al. 2005); the test of associative 
memory was only applied in the second follow-up survey. In both the first and second follow-up 
surveys we included a test of leg motor development from the McCarthy test battery (Boivin et al. 
1995). The final test we use is the Behavior Problem Index (BPI), which is based on the caregiver’s 
report of the frequency that a child displays each of 29 problematic behaviors, with responses coded 
as “never”, “sometimes” and “often” (Baker and Mott 1989). We use the number of behavioral 
problems for which a caregiver answers “often”.
11   
All of the tests were carefully piloted in the field, and adjustments were made, as necessary. 
Many of these tests have been applied in similar populations in Latin America, including in the 
evaluations of cash transfer programs in Ecuador and Mexico (see Paxson and Schady 2010 and 
Fernald et al. 2008, respectively). An important advantage of the tests we use, with the exception of 
the BPI and a subset of items in the Denver, is that they provide observed, as opposed to parent-
                                                 
11 Unlike the other outcomes we study, behavioral problems do not necessarily indicate a delay, as there are no 
benchmarks or established ages at which they are predicted to decrease.    11 
reported, measures of child development.
12 This substantially reduces concerns about reporting 
biases. Details of all of the tests we use are provided in Appendix 3. 
The two follow-up surveys also include information on stimulation, birthweight, preventive 
health care, and caregivers’ mental health. Mental health was measured using the Center for 
Epidemiological Studies Depression scale (CESD), a widely used measure of depression which 
consists of 20 questions on self-reported depression (Radloff 1977). Finally, caregivers’ observed 
parenting behavior was registered through a shortened version of the HOME score, an index of 11 
positive and negative behaviors that the enumerator observes during interviewing and testing 
(Bradley 1993; Paxson and Schady 2007, 2010). 
Table 1 summarizes the baseline characteristics of households in our sample, focusing on 
socioeconomic status and child health. It shows that households and children are disadvantaged in a 
number of important ways. Expenditure levels are very low. Turning the local currency units 
(Córdobas) into US $ shows that 81 percent of households in our sample have per capita 
expenditures that are below one dollar per capita per day. The mean years of schooling of mothers 
are 4 years, and 66 percent have not completed primary school. The mean years of schooling of 
fathers is equally low, and 72 percent have not completed primary school. Children in this sample 
have substantial health problems—27 percent are stunted (have height for their age that is more than 
two standard deviations below that of a reference population). Weight-for-height is not particularly 
low. The composition of food expenditures shows that a very high proportion of consumption 
consists of staples (59 percent), in particular tortilla, rice, and beans. Much smaller proportions of 
food consumption are animal products (16 percent) and, in particular, fruits and vegetables (5 
percent). This suggests that lack of balance in diets, rather than insufficient overall caloric intake, 
may be part of the explanation for the nutritional deficiencies in this population. 
                                                 
12 For the Denver subtests, there are no significant differences between children in the treatment and control groups in 
the likelihood that items were administered by direct observation rather than caregivers’ report (see appendix 3).   12 
  Table 2 focuses on our measures of child development. It reports the fraction of children in 
the control group who are in the bottom 25 percent and, separately, the bottom 10 percent of the 
international distribution that was used to standardize a given test.
13 The table shows that a very 
large fraction of children in our sample is delayed, although this varies considerably by outcome. 
The fraction of children who are behind for their age is largest for the measures of language—96 
percent of children in our sample are in the lowest quartile of the distribution of the TVIP, and 84 
percent have a score that places them in the lowest decile. Comparable numbers for the measure of 
language in the Denver test place 82 percent of children in the lowest quartile, and 60 percent in the 
lowest decile. A very large fraction of children in our sample is also delayed in memory—84 
percent place in the lowest quartile of the test of short-term memory, and 58 percent in the lowest 
decile of the distribution used to standardize the test. In the case of the test of associative memory, 
87 percent of children place in the lowest quartile, and 75 percent in the lowest decile. 
These delays in language and memory are severe. For instance, the numbers for the TVIP 
imply that 85 percent of the children in our sample are at least 21 months delayed in receptive 
vocabulary. However, the implied delays are reasonably consistent with those observed among 
other populations with high poverty levels and low education in Latin America.
14   
Turning to other domains of child development, Table 2 shows that outcomes are somewhat 
better on the social-personal scale of the Denver—47 percent of children in the sample place in the 
lowest decile—and for fine motor skills—39 percent place in the lowest decile for this outcome. 
                                                 
13 For this purpose we use data from the first follow-up survey for all tests except for the test of associative memory, 
which was only collected in the second follow-up survey. Results are very similar if we use the second follow-up survey 
for all of these calculations. 
14 Our analysis shares two tests with the results reported in Paxson and Schady (2007, 2010) and Schady (2011), namely 
the TVIP and the Woodcock-Johnson measure of associative memory. The average child in the sample from Ecuador 
places in the 11
th percentile of the distribution of the TVIP, and in the 13
th percentile of the test of associative memory. 
In our sample of children from Nicaragua, the average child places in the 6
th percentile of the distribution of the TVIP 
and the 10
th percentile of the test of associative memory. We note that the sample of children from Ecuador is 
considerably better off. 34 percent of households in the Ecuador study have consumption levels that are below one US 
dollar per capita per day, compared to 82 percent of households in this study. There are also marked differences in 
parental education, which is very robustly associated with performance on the cognitive tests—the average education of 
mothers in the Ecuador sample is 6.7, compared to 4.2 for the sample used in our paper.   13 
Children in our sample perform even better in terms of gross motor skills: a much smaller fraction 
of children, 29 percent, place in the lowest decile of the distribution of the Denver, and 23 percent 
place in the lowest decile of the McCarthy leg motor scale. In addition to documenting the large 
fractions of children in our sample that are delayed, Table 2 shows that there are no obvious 
differences in delays between boys and girls. However, delays increase with child age for some 
outcomes.  
It is more likely that cash transfers like those made by Atención a Crisis will result in 
improvements in cognitive development if there are socioeconomic gradients in these outcomes. 
Figure 1 presents nonparametric (Fan) regressions of each standardized outcome on log per capita 
expenditures among children in control communities (Fan and Gijbels 1996). The figure shows 
positive socioeconomic gradients in most measures of cognitive development. Gradients appear to 
be steepest for language (in particular, for the TVIP), height-for-age and weight-for-age.  
Table 1 checks for balance between households randomly assigned to receive Atención a 
Crisis transfers and the control group (fourth column) and between households randomly assigned 
to the three treatment groups (basic treatment, training, lump-sum transfer – last two columns). The 
table shows that, by and large, random assignment equated the characteristics of households and 
children randomly assigned to different groups. Only one of 35 characteristics, whether the child 
received deworming drugs, is significantly different between treatment and control groups at the 5 
percent level; for only one characteristic, the number of rooms in a house, can we reject the null of 
equal baseline means across the three treatment groups at the 5 percent level; and only for one 
characteristic, mother’s education, can we reject the null of no differences between the basic 
treatment and lump-sum payment, which is the focus of the results we present on differences across 
treatment groups.    14 
Although random assignment was successful, there are some small differences at baseline 
between households that were assigned to treatment and control groups. For example, children in 
the treatment group have somewhat lower height and weight than those in the control group. They 
are also less likely to have been weighed, and to have received vitamins or deworming drugs in the 
six months prior to the baseline survey. These differences suggest that it may be important to 
control for the baseline characteristics of households and children when estimating Atención a 
Crisis program effects on child development. We return to this point below. 
   
3.  Methods 
  We estimate child-level intent-to-treat regressions of the following form: 
(1)  Yk = αkT + βkX + εk,  k=1…K,  
where   is the kth outcome (out of 10 in the first follow-up survey, 11 in the second follow-up 
survey), T is a treatment indicator which takes on the value of one for children in communities that 
were randomly assigned to receive Atención a Crisis benefits, and X is a set of controls (including 
an intercept). To make it easier to draw comparisons across outcomes, we first convert each 
outcome into a within-sample z-score by subtracting the sample mean and dividing by the standard 
deviation of the control group.
15 Also, we reverse the signs on the BPI, so that higher values 
correspond to “better” outcomes (as with the other outcomes). The coefficients on the treatment 
indicator therefore measure effect sizes in standard deviation units.  
In one set of specifications, X includes only controls for the child’s age when the transfers 
started, in single-month intervals, and an indicator for the child’s gender. In another set of 
specifications, X also includes a number of baseline characteristics: age and gender of the household 
head, the years of schooling of the mother, the number of household members, the fraction of 
                                                 
15 We use the standard deviation of the control group in 2006 for both years, in order to be able to compare magnitudes 
across years.    15 
members in five age categories, birth weight, height-for-age, weight-for-age, TVIP score, whether a 
child has been weighed, received deworming medicine, and vitamin A in the last six months, 
baseline community averages of height-for-age, weight-for-age, and TVIP score, and municipal 
fixed effects.
16 Including these controls helps adjust for small baseline differences between treated 
and control groups, and may also make the estimated program effects more precise. Standard errors 
adjust for clustering at the community level. 
In addition to estimating the effect for individual outcomes, we estimate the average 
treatment effect, across all outcome measures, and separately for the subsets of 6 cognitive and 
behavioral outcomes and 5 health and motor outcomes:  
(2)   
We estimate (1) or (2) by running seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) for all (or a subset) of 
outcomes, and using the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the estimates to calculate the 
standard error of   (see Kling et al. 2007; Duflo et al. 2008).  
We also estimate intent-to-treat regressions that allow for separate effects for households 
that were randomly assigned to the three Atención a Crisis treatment packages:  
(3)  Yk = γkT1 + ηkT2 + λkT3 +βkX + εk,  k=1…K,  
where T1, T2 and T3 correspond to the basic treatment, the training package, and the lump-sum 
payment package, respectively. Finally, to tease out the role of higher expenditures on child 
development, we limit the sample to households assigned to either T1 or T3, and run regressions of 
the following form: 
(4)  Yk = θkT3 + βkX + εk,  k=1…K,  
                                                 
16 In those cases where there are missing values for the covariates, we include the sample mean. However, our results 
are robust to including only covariates with very few missing values.  
   16 
  In this case, the coefficients θk are an estimate of the difference in outcomes between 
children in households assigned to the basic treatment and those that in addition were assigned to 
receive the lump-sum payment.  
 
4.  Results  
A.  Overall program effects 
  Our main results on the effect of the Atención a Crisis program on child health and 
development are reported in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 focuses on program effects on individual 
outcomes in 2006 (upper panel) and 2008 (lower panel). In each case we include specifications that 
include controls for age and gender only (first row), and the extended set of controls described 
above (second row). All regressions are limited to children younger than six years of age at the time 
the transfers started (November 2005), as well as children born into these households since then. 
The results in Table 3 are generally consistent with positive Atención a Crisis effects on 
child health and development. More than three-quarters (33 out of 42) of the coefficients are 
positive, and almost one-half of those that are positive (15 out of 33) are significant at the 10 
percent level or higher. There are no significant negative coefficients. The evidence in favor of 
positive program effects is stronger in those specifications that include the extended set of controls 
than in those that only include controls for child age and gender. This likely reflects a small degree 
of imbalance between treatment and control at baseline, as seen in Table 1. In the case of the 
regressions of child height and weight, where the baseline imbalance was apparent, all of the 
coefficients are negative with the basic set of controls, but positive with the extended set of 
controls.  
Table 4 reports the average effect across all outcomes, and separately for cognitive and 
socio-emotional development (the two language tests, the two memory tests, the two behavioral   17 
tests) and health and motor development (the measures of gross motor, leg motor, fine motor, height 
and weight). The upper panel reports the mean effect sizes in 2006 and the lower panel in 2008, as 
before. 
The first two rows in each panel correspond to the specifications in Table 3. In the 
specification with extended controls, households randomized into the Atención a Crisis program 
had outcomes that were 0.09 standard deviation higher than households randomized into the control 
group in 2006, and 0.08 standard deviations higher in 2008. In both years, the p-values for the mean 
effect sizes are below 0.01. For the cognitive and socio-emotional outcomes the program effects are 
0.12 standard deviations in 2006 and 0.08 standard deviations in 2008. For the health and motor 
outcomes the program effects are 0.05 standard deviations in 2006 and 0.07 standard deviations in 
2008.  
Other rows in the table provide three important robustness checks on our main results. The 
Denver and the BPI tests are based, in part, on parents’ reports about their children’s development. 
It is conceivable that parents randomly assigned into the Atención a Crisis program were more 
likely to over-report the development of their children because they thought that this is what 
enumerators expected to hear (although it is unclear why this would affect the results for 2008, two 
years after the program had ended). It is also possible that the program made parents better able to 
detect delays in child development, in which case the treatment effects we estimate could be biased 
down. To check for these kinds of effects, we recalculated the averages but excluded the Denver 
and BPI. Excluding tests that are partly parent-reported does not have a substantive effect on our 
results—the mean effect size for the remaining outcomes is 0.12 standard deviations in 2006 and 
0.06 standard deviations in 2008, both of which are highly significant. Thus, it does not appear that 
the positive program effects we estimate are a result of systematic misreporting by Atención a Crisis 
beneficiaries.   18 
One difficulty in comparing the magnitude of the effects in 2006 and 2008 is that new 
children are born into the sample. Also, baseline children can age into tests that can only be applied 
to those 36 months or older, or age out of the Denver when they turn seven years of age or older. 
Therefore, the composition of the sample changes between 2006 and 2008. Moreover, the 2008 
survey included an additional memory test. To see how this could affect our results, we report 
results that exclude the associative memory test, and are estimated over a “restricted” sample of 
children who took a given test in both years.
 17 The results for this smaller sample are very similar to 
those for the full sample: They suggest average Atención a Crisis program effects of 0.07 standard 
deviations in 2006 and 0.08 standard deviations in 2008.  
Our main specification includes all children of relevant ages who were living in the sample 
of households randomized into a particular group at baseline, plus all additional children that were 
born to baseline household members. This implies that the person who received the cash transfer 
(the “titular”) was not always the mother of the child in our sample. Moreover, in a small number of 
cases, households split between baseline and the first or second follow-up, so the titular might no 
longer be living with the children we study. As a final robustness check, we restrict the sample to 
include only children of the titular at baseline (excluding children of other household members) and 
still living with the titular at the time of the follow-up surveys. Again, these results are similar to 
those from the larger sample—the mean effect size across all outcomes is 0.07 standard deviations 
in 2006 and 2008. This suggests that the program effects we estimate are not primarily a result of 
any possible effects of the Atención a Crisis program on household formation or dissolution.
18 
                                                 
17 This also implies that the duration of exposure to the program is the same for all the children in this restricted sample, 
including the youngest children, if one includes the time in-utero and given that the 2006 follow-up was conducted 9 
months after the start of the transfers. 
18 The Atención a Crisis program effects we estimate are also robust to accounting in alternative ways for the 
relationship between the child and the titular, the main caregiver and the mother, to removing outliers, and to different 
ways of coding the tests. Results for families of outcomes are also similar when estimating the impact on the average of 
the standardized test scores, instead of using SUR (see Kling et al. 2007). We also tested for heterogeneity by child age   19 
In sum, the results in Table 4 make clear that the Atención a Crisis program improved the 
health and development of children in beneficiary households. There is no evidence that the positive 
program effects we estimate are a result of systematic misreporting by parents. There is no apparent 
fade-out of program effects two years after the program ended, and the persistence of program 
effects cannot be explained by compositional changes in the sample.  
 
B.  Disaggregated effects by treatment package 
An important question is whether the changes in child outcomes we observe can plausibly 
be explained by the income effect of the transfer alone. To answer this question we first estimate the 
impact of the Atención a Crisis program on the log of total per capita expenditures. These results 
are in Table 5. In the first column of the table, we report the results from a specification for the 
program as a whole, without differentiating by treatment package. The second through fourth 
columns separately estimate the effect of the basic treatment, the basic treatment plus training grant, 
and the basic treatment plus lump-sum transfer.  
The results in Table 5 make clear that the Atención a Crisis program had large effects on 
household per capita expenditures in 2006. The specification for the full sample, including the 
extended set of controls, shows that households randomly assigned to the basic treatment increased 
their expenditures by 28 log points.
19 The coefficient on households that received the basic 
treatment plus the lump-sum payment implies an increase in per capita expenditures of 33 log 
points. The relatively small difference in total expenditures between households assigned to receive 
only the basic treatment and those assigned to also receive the lump-sum payment can be explained 
                                                                                                                                                                 
and gender. Program effects are generally somewhat larger for children who were older at baseline and for girls. These 
results are available from the authors upon request. 
19 This increase in expenditures is substantially larger than the magnitude of the transfer: On average, households in this 
group received a transfer of US $20 per month, but increased their expenditures (a large share of which is food 
expenditures, with recall of the last two weeks) by almost US $35. The transfers were made somewhat irregularly, and 
the two transfers prior to the survey had occurred in a period of 6 weeks (instead of 2 months), including one just prior 
to the survey, which could explain the large effect on per capita consumption.   20 
by the timing of the payment. The largest share of the lump-sum payment was made at the end of 
May, and the first follow-up survey was collected between July and August of that year.
20 The small 
increase in expenditures in households that received the lump-sum payment is also consistent with 
households investing (part of) the additional transfer in income-generating activities, as was 
intended. 
Results for 2008, in the second row of the table, show that households that received the 
lump-sum payment continue to have higher per capita expenditures than those in the control group, 
about 8.8 log points. In contrast, the effect of the basic treatment on per capita expenditures is very 
small, about 2.2 log points, and is not significantly different from zero. This is not surprising given 
that the program had ended, and transfers had been discontinued, for approximately two years. An 
F-test rejects the null of equal coefficients for the basic treatment and the lump-sum payment in 
both 2006 and 2008.  
  Table 5 shows that households randomly assigned to the lump-sum payment had 
significantly higher consumption levels than those assigned to the basic treatment, most clearly in 
2008. We therefore next compare child development outcomes for these two groups of households 
by estimating equation (4). These results are reported in Table 6. They show no evidence of better 
child development outcomes among households that received the lump-sum payment, relative to 
those that only received the basic treatment.  
  On the basis of the values in the table we conducted a simple back of the envelope 
calculation. Households that received the lump-sum payment had per capita expenditures that were 
5 log points higher than those that received only the basic treatment in 2006, and 6.6 log points 
higher in 2008. If the program effects on expenditures for 2007, when there was no survey, are 
reasonably similar to those for 2006 and 2008, then households assigned to receive lump-sum 
                                                 
20 This timing also implies that all groups likely had similar levels of consumption for the first 7 months of the transfers.    21 
payments had cumulative per capita expenditures roughly 17 log points higher than those assigned 
to the basic treatment over the three-year period between 2006 and 2008. In 2006, households 
assigned to receive the basic treatment had per capita expenditure levels that were 28 log points 
higher than those assigned to the control group, and child development outcomes that were 0.088 
standard deviations higher. Conservatively, we would therefore expect that children in households 
assigned to the lump-sum payment would have child development outcomes that are 0.053 standard 
deviations [(17/28)*0.088] higher than those assigned to receive the basic treatment. In fact, this 
value falls outside the 90 percent confidence interval (-0.032 to 0.046) for the effect of the lump-
sum payment, relative to the basic treatment. Similarly, for the family of cognitive development 
outcomes, we would expect that children in households assigned to the lump-sum payment would 
have child development outcomes that are 0.072 standard deviations [(17/28)*0.118] higher than 
those assigned to receive the basic treatment. This value falls outside the 99 percent confidence 
interval (-0.074 to 0.059) for the effect of the lump-sum payment relative to the basic treatment.  
In sum, the higher expenditure levels of households that randomly received the lump-sum 
treatment do not appear to have resulted in better child development outcomes, especially in terms 
of cognitive development. It is possible that this is a result of convexity in the relationship between 
outcomes and expenditures—although Figure 1 shows no evidence of such non-linearities for most 
outcomes. More likely, perhaps, the results suggest that something other than (or in addition to) the 
cash explains the Atención a Crisis treatment effects on child development we observe. 
One limitation of the comparison between households randomly assigned to the basic 
treatment and the lump-sum payment is the fact that the latter were expected to start a small 
business. In particular, one concern is that starting a small business may itself have an effect on 
child development. The lump-sum payment is therefore not a clean measure of the possible effects 
of the additional cash. To assess the extent to which these concerns are important, Table 7 compares   22 
the economic activity of mothers, patterns of work and time use, maternal mental health, and the 
home environment between households randomly assigned to the basic treatment and the lump-sum 
payment.  
As expected, Table 7 shows that mothers assigned to the lump-sum payment spent fewer 
days in wage work than those assigned to the basic treatment, and more days in self-employment. In 
total, mothers assigned to the lump-sum payment worked 33 more days in 2006 (from a control 
group mean of 71 days), but there is no significant difference in the total number of days worked in 
2008. There is no evidence that mothers assigned to the lump-sum payment spent fewer hours 
taking care of their children than those that received the basic treatment, no matter whether we 
consider hours that were devoted only to caregiving or also hours of caregiving while working. 
Mothers assigned to the lump-sum payment were as likely to read or tell stories to their children. 
Finally, there is no evidence that the lump-sum transfer had an effect on the mental health of 
mothers or on the quality of the home environment. In sum, the lump-sum payment does not appear 
to have had any obvious, negative effects on the amount or quality of the time that mothers spent 
with their children. Thus, the absence of better child development outcomes for households in the 
lump-sum transfer group, in spite of the larger transfers they received and the higher overall levels 
of expenditures, cannot easily be explained by other changes that could have had a deleterious 
effect on child development.   
 
C.  Changes in the use of intermediate inputs 
We next analyze Atención a Crisis program effects on a number of “risk factors” that have 
been identified as important determinants of child development in the literature—namely, 
expenditures on food, availability of micro-nutrients, inadequate stimulation, exposure to infectious 
disease and caregivers’ mental health (see the review by Walker et al. 2007).    23 
Table 8 reports the effects of the Atención a Crisis program on various measures of these 
risk factors. We include both estimates of changes in individual outcomes, and averages across 
families of inputs (the latter, in standard deviation units, as before). The top panel of the table 
reports results for 2006, and the bottom panel for 2008. The first two columns focuses on the impact 
of the Atención a Crisis program, without distinguishing between treatment packages, while the last 
column focuses only on the effects of the basic treatment, relative to the control group.  
The first column in Table 8 shows that the Atención a Crisis program had a substantial 
effect on the use of various inputs into child development. In 2006, households randomly assigned 
to the program changed the composition of food expenditures—spending a lower fraction on 
staples, and higher fractions on animal proteins, fruits and vegetables;
21 treated households had 
substantial increases in various measures of child stimulation—they were more likely to tell stories, 
sing to, or read to their children, and to have pen, paper and toys for children in the house; children 
in households randomly assigned to the Atención a Crisis program were also more likely to have 
been weighed, received iron, vitamins or deworming medicine, and they spent fewer days in bed. 
The magnitude of the changes is substantial. For example, the mean increase in stimulation is 0.26 
standard deviations, and the mean increase in health inputs is 0.13 standard deviations. 
In Nicaragua, as elsewhere, wealthier households generally spend more on relatively 
expensive sources of calories (animal proteins and fresh fruits and vegetables, rather than staples); 
provide more inputs for child stimulation (books, toys); and make more use of preventive health 
services. At first blush, then, the overall program effects for 2006 may not be surprising, given that 
the Atención a Crisis program made substantial cash transfers. The remaining results in Table 8 
                                                 
21 We also investigated whether treated households report a higher number of days that children consumed specific food 
items, including tortillas, milk, meat, eggs, fruits and vegetables in the last week. These results are consistent with those 
in Table 8 for 2006, but differences between treated and control households are no longer significant in 2008. We note, 
however, that there is considerably less variability in these measures of reported intake than in the measures of 
household expenditures used for Table 8.    24 
investigate whether the effects of the program on the use of various inputs into child development 
are consistent with an explanation that focuses on the cash transfer alone. 
The second column of the table includes controls for the log of total per capita expenditures, 
and its square. Controlling for the higher total expenditures of the Atención a Crisis beneficiaries 
has only a modest effect on the estimated coefficients. For example, the mean increase in 
stimulation among treated households from these regressions for 2006 is 0.20 standard deviations 
(rather than 0.26 standard deviations in the regressions that do not control for total expenditure 
levels), while the increase in health inputs is 0.12 standard deviations (rather than 0.13 standard 
deviations). It does not seem that the higher use of inputs into child development by Atención a 
Crisis households can easily be explained by their higher overall expenditure levels alone.
22 
An important caveat for these estimates is that total expenditures are themselves determined 
by the Atención a Crisis program, which could bias the regression coefficients. The remaining 
results in the table attempt to deal with this concern. Recall from Table 5 that households assigned 
to receive only the basic treatment did not have higher expenditures than those in the control group 
in 2008—the coefficient in a regression of the log of total per capita expenditures for these 
households is 0.022 (with a standard error of 0.028). Nevertheless, these households continue to 
show significant differences in the use of inputs into child development. On average, households 
that were randomly assigned the basic treatment had a 0.12 standard deviation increase in 
stimulation, and a 0.08 standard deviation increase in health inputs, relative to those in the control 
group, in 2008. Households assigned to the basic treatment also continued to devote a higher 
fraction of food expenditures to animal proteins and a lower fraction to staples. These effects cannot 
easily be explained by any contemporaneous income effect of the transfer. Rather, they suggest that 
                                                 
22 We also conducted a similar analysis non-parametrically by running Fan regressions of the nutrition, stimulation, 
health and environment inputs as a function of the log of total per capita expenditures, separately for households in the 
Atención a Crisis treatment and control groups. These results are very similar in character to those in Table 8, and are 
available from the authors upon request.   25 
the Atención a Crisis program had an effect on behavior, and that some of these behavioral changes 
were still apparent two years after the program had been discontinued.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
In many developing countries, young children suffer from profound delays in cognitive 
development. These delays have serious implications for the success of these children as adults. A 
variety of theories of skill formation suggest that investments in schooling and other dimensions of 
human capital will have low returns if children do not have adequate levels of cognitive and social 
skills at early ages (for example, Cunha et al. 2006). Understanding the causes of deficits in early 
childhood and identifying interventions that can help address them are important priorities for 
research. 
This paper uses a randomized evaluation to assess the impact of a cash transfer program on a 
large set of measures of child development in Nicaragua, a low-income country. The identification 
is straightforward—it is based on random assignment, with almost perfect compliance, and 
remarkably low levels of attrition over three survey waves. We show that a program that transferred 
cash to women improved child development. Remarkably, there was no fade-out of impacts two 
years after the program was ended and transfers discontinued. This stands in contrast with 
evaluations of a number of interventions in both developed and developing countries. 
The magnitude of the effects we estimate is modest, but not trivial. One way of putting the 
magnitude in context is by comparing it with differences in outcomes between children of mothers 
with more or less schooling. In the control group, every year of maternal schooling is associated 
with 0.05 standard deviations better child development, on average. The program effects we 
estimate are therefore equivalent to comparing children with mothers with one-and-a-half more or 
less years of schooling—a substantial amount, given the control group average of four years of   26 
schooling. Another way of putting the magnitude in context is by comparing it with the impacts of 
interventions on child development estimated elsewhere. Paxson and Schady (2010) estimate that 
the BDH unconditional transfer program in Ecuador had an insignificant impact of 0.05 standard 
deviations on cognitive and socio-emotional development, and an effect of 0.18 standard deviations 
for the poorest quartile of children. Berlinski et al. (2009) report an effect size of 0.23 standard 
deviations for the impact of one year of preschool for children age 3-5 years of age on learning 
outcomes in Argentina. Behrman et al. (2004) report an impact of 3-4 percent of the mean for a 
preschool program in Bolivia. All of these estimates refer to cognitive outcomes, and to children 36 
months and older. Atención a Crisis program effects on cognitive outcomes (language and memory) 
for these older children are 0.19 standard deviations in 2006, and 0.20 in 2008. Our estimates are 
therefore very close in magnitude to those that have been reported from other settings in Latin 
America. 
Households who benefited from transfers increased expenditures on critical inputs into child 
development. They spent more on nutrient-rich foods, provided more early stimulation to their 
children, and made more use of preventive health care. Changes in the use of these inputs are larger 
than what one would expect to see if the program were simply moving children along the curves 
that relate inputs to overall expenditures. Thus, the program appears to have resulted in behavioral 
changes. Some of these behavioral changes persisted after the program ended, although the 
differences in input use between the Atención a Crisis treatment and control groups are generally 
smaller than when the program was still operating. It is therefore not clear whether the persistence 
of better child development outcomes among Atención a Crisis beneficiaries is a result of the one-
time jump in outcomes that took place while the program was operating, or behavioral changes that 
continued after the program ended. We note, however, that the fact that fade-out of impacts appears   27 
to occur for many different early childhood programs suggests that the behavioral changes among 
Atención a Crisis beneficiaries are likely to be important.  
The Atención a Crisis program randomized three treatment variations. One of the treatment 
groups had significantly higher per capita expenditure both during the program and after the 
program ended. We find no evidence that child development outcomes are better for these 
households. Thus, in Nicaragua, a dollar is not always a dollar (or, rather, a Córdoba is not always a 
Córdoba). Something other than, or in addition to, the cash appears to be important. The social 
marketing that accompanied the transfers, or the fact that transfers were made to women, or both, 
could be part of the explanation. A better understanding of what features of this and other cash 
transfer programs account for improvements in child development is an important priority for future 
research.   28 
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Figure 1: Socio-economic gradients of test outcomes in control communities 
 
Note: Outcomes for 2006, except associative memory which is for 2008. All outcomes are standardized by subtracting 
the mean and dividing by the standard deviation of the control group. Sample includes children under 6 years old when 
the transfers started and all children born in sample households since. For the Denver (personal, language, fine motor, 
gross motor), the sample includes children upto 83 months; for the TVIP (receptive language), McCarthy (memory, leg 
motor), Woodcock-Munoz (associative memory) and BPI the sample includes children 36 months or older; height-for-
age and weight-for-age is for all children. For the Denver test, calculations are based on the number of delays, for TVIP, 
McCarthy and Woodcock-Munoz calculations are based on raw test scores. Vertical lines are included at 10
th and 90
th 
percentiles of log per capita expenditures in control communities. Fan regressions with bandwidth of 0.99.  2.5% highest 
and lowest outliers of log(pce) trimmed from graph.   35 
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Appendix 1: Design of Atención a Crisis and its evaluation 
Further information on the Atención a Crisis interventions 
From November 2005 until December 2006, the Ministry of the family in Nicaragua 
(MIFAMILIA) implemented the Atención a Crisis pilot program in 6 municipalities in the northern 
part of the country. The municipalities were selected for their extreme levels of poverty and because 
they had been affected by a severe drought in the previous year. The program had two objectives. 
First, it aimed to serve as a short-run safety net by providing cash transfers to reduce the need for 
adverse coping mechanisms, such as taking children out of school or reductions in food 
consumption. Second, the program intended to promote long run upward mobility and poverty 
reduction by enhancing households’ asset base and income diversification capacity. 
A total of 3002 households were selected to participate in the program. These households 
were allocated one of three different packages through a participatory lottery:  
(i) A conditional cash transfer (CCT). 
(ii) A conditional cash transfer plus a scholarship that allowed one of the household members to 
participate in a vocational training course. 
(iii) A conditional cash transfer plus a productive investment grant, aimed at encouraging recipients 
to start a small non-agricultural activity. 
All selected beneficiary households received the basic CCT. All households, including those 
without children, received bi-monthly payments, adding up to a total transfer of US $ 145 during 
the year of the program. Households with children between 7 and 15 enrolled in and attending 
primary school received an additional US $ 90 per household, and an additional US $ 25 per child 
(with all amounts referring to the total transfer received over the year), conditional on school 
enrollment and attendance. The school enrollment and attendance requirement was carefully 
monitored by the ministry, through data received from the primary school teachers. The program   44 
was also meant to include a condition that required that households with children under the age of 6 
would take these children to health centers for preventive health check-ups. However, due to 
implementation problems, these visits to the health centers were not monitored by the program 
(Aguilera et al. 2006). 
In addition to the CCT, one third of the beneficiary households also received a scholarship 
that allowed one of the adult household members (preferably a member between 15 and 25 years of 
age) to choose among a number of vocational training courses offered in the municipal 
headquarters. In addition to covering the costs of the training, the program also compensated the 
participants for lost wages while in training, up to 6 months (US $15 per month). The scholarship 
was conditional on regular attendance at the course. The courses aimed at providing participants 
with new skills for income diversification outside of subsistence farming. These beneficiaries were 
also offered labor-market and business-skill training workshops organized in their own 
communities.  
Finally, another third of the beneficiary households received, in addition to the CCT, a grant 
for productive investments aimed at encouraging recipients to start a small non-agricultural business 
activity with the goal of asset creation and income diversification. This grant was conditional on the 
household developing a business development plan, outlining the objectives of the business and 
proposed investments in new livestock or non-agricultural income-generating activities. 
Beneficiaries received technical assistance to make a business plan and also participated in 
business-skills training workshops organized in their own communities.  
Due to implementation delays, the vocational training courses had not started at the moment 
the data of the 2006 follow-up survey were collected. They took place in the fall of 2006. At the 
time of the 2006 survey, the difference between the vocational training beneficiaries and those of 
the basic CCT package was hence limited, though they might have had different expectations about   45 
future skills, about related future income and/or expectations about compensation for the time spent 
in training. The beneficiaries of the productive investment package, on the other hand, had received 
the largest amount of benefits: at the end of May 2006 they had received $175 to invest in a 
nonagricultural activity. The remaining $25 was to be paid on the next payment day (after survey 
completion). In addition they had received technical assistance to select the activity and develop a 
business plan, help which they were still receiving during the 2006 follow-up survey.  
All beneficiaries of the Atención a Crisis program, regardless of the treatment they were 
assigned to, were exposed to repeated information and communication efforts by program staff 
during enrollment and pay-days. These stressed the importance of varied diets, health, and 
education, and were meant to change household investment and consumption patterns. Program 
participants were also required to participate in a number of local events and talks ranging from 
discussions on nutrition practices to workshops on business development and labor market skills. A 
subset of beneficiary women were selected during the registration assemblies to serve as 
promotoras or leaders of small groups of beneficiary women (approximately 10 per group) in order 
to further enhance information flows and motivation and to encourage compliance with the various 
program requirements and conditionalities. Specifically, the promotoras were expected to 
frequently meet with the beneficiaries in their groups to talk about the objectives and the 
conditionalities of the program.  
 
Further information on the impact evaluation design 
The program was targeted to 6 municipalities in the Northwest of Nicaragua.
23 From the list 
of all communities in the 6 municipalities, 56 intervention and 50 control communities were 
                                                 
23 The budget for the pilot allowed targeting 3000 households for a one-year period, which was much smaller than the 
population of the 6 municipalities. The program was therefore allocated randomly. Households were notified that 
funding of the project implied that the program would last 1 year, and would only cover the treatment communities.   46 
randomly selected through a lottery to which the mayors of the 6 municipalities were invited to 
attend and participate.
24 Baseline data on household assets and household composition were then 
used to define program eligibility, resulting in the identification of 3002 households to participate in 
the program. This amounts to more than 90 percent of the households in treatment communities, 
and includes 95 percent of households with children under 6 years old. The eligibility criteria were 
determined using the proxy means methodology developed for the RPS and based on the national 
household data from 2001 (EMNV). Additional discussions with local leaders from each 
intervention community were conducted to identify possible exclusion or inclusion errors. Based on 
the discussions with leaders, 3.7 percent of all the households considered were re-assigned from 
non-eligible to eligible, and 3.7 percent from eligible to non-eligible. To avoid any possible 
selection bias resulting from the re-assignment by the leaders, the results we present use eligibility 
by the proxy means as the intent-to-treat (without taking into account the reclassification by the 
community leaders). 
From each eligible household, the female household member who was reported as the 
primary caregiver was then invited to a registration assembly.
25  During the assemblies, the program 
objectives and its various components were explained, women were asked to enroll in the program, 
and promotoras were selected on a voluntary basis. Among the intent-to-treat households, 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Households in the control communities did not receive any program benefits. They were notified that if there was a 
decision to scale up the program after the initial year, the control communities would be incorporated. People in the 
treatment communities understood the program was only to last for a year, and people in the control communities knew 
that there was a possibility they might receive the program the next year. They also knew it was likely to depend on the 
result of the national elections that were to be organized at the end of that year. In that election, the government changed 
and the project was not scaled up. 
24 Before the lottery, all communities in the 6 municipalities were grouped in pairs based on similarity in road access 
and microclimate. Through the lottery, one community of each pair was selected as a treatment community, the other as 
control. In case of uneven number of communities, a “pair” consisted of the largest community and the combination of 
the two other communities. The identification of communities and community pairs was based on maps and discussions 
with municipality technical personnel. Communities tend to be geographically separated from each other, which reduces 
the potential for spillover effects from the treatment to the control communities.  
25 In the few cases where there was no adult female in the household, an adult male was selected as the program 
recipient.    47 
enrollment in the program was about 95%.
26 At the end of each assembly, all the beneficiaries 
participated in a lottery process through which the three packages described above were randomly 
allocated among the eligible households. Specifically, each beneficiary was asked to randomly draw 
a ball with 1 of 3 colors from a black, nontransparent bag. For each assembly, the bags contained an 
equal number of balls of each color, and the total number of balls matched the total number of 
beneficiaries in the assembly. At the end of the day each color was matched to an intervention 
package through another lottery attended by all beneficiaries from the community. Hence, at the 
moment households signed up for the program, they did not know which of the three interventions 
package they would end up receiving.
27 Take-up of the CCT component was the same for all 
packages. Take up of the additional packages was also high. Among households enrolled in the 
program, 89 percent of the households eligible for the vocational training grant enrolled a household 
member in a course. Take-up of the productive investment grant among eligible households in the 
program was almost 100 percent. About 10 percent of the business development plans had initially 
been refused by the Ministry of the Family, but these were sent back to the households and virtually 
all of them developed a new plan, with the help of technical assistance (with the few exceptions 
being households that migrated out after the registration assemblies). 
Given the objectives of the program, the outcomes that the impact evaluation as a whole 
focuses on are related to household investments in human capital and productive assets. Among 
human capital outcomes, there was a strong interest on early childhood development outcomes, the 
focus of this paper.
28 This was motivated by anecdotal evidence of early childhood delays in the 
region of study during baseline pretesting, and given the lack of evidence on CCT effects on ECD 
                                                 
26 Of the 5 percent that did not enroll, the majority are households that had been reclassified by the leaders. The 
remainder are households that had migrated out of the treatment communities by the start of the program, and (very 
few) cases of households that refused the program.  
27 Due to the transparency of the process, the lottery process was widely perceived as fair. Participation by the invited 
beneficiaries to the assemblies and lotteries was near 100%.  
28 See Macours and Vakis (2009) for short-term impacts on other outcome variables.    48 
outcomes. With this objective, a cognitive test (TVIP) was added to the baseline survey, and data on 
anthropometrics were collected. In both follow-up surveys a more extensive set of tests was 
conducted (see appendix 3). 
Data were collected at baseline on all households in the treatment communities, and for a 
random sample of households in the control group. The sample size in the control communities was 
chosen to be equal to one-third of the population in the treatment, in order to obtain a control group 
of equal size to each of the treatment groups. The proxy means test used to identify eligible 
households in the treatment communities was also used to identify households that would have been 
eligible in the control communities.  
   49 
 
Appendix 2: Attrition 
 
 
Attrition can potentially introduce serious biases into the estimation of program effects. In 
this study, attrition between the baseline and follow-up surveys was minimal. Only 1.3 percent and 
2.4 percent of households interviewed at baseline could not be re-interviewed in 2006 and 2008, 
respectively. Among children less than 6 years old when the transfers started and living in the 
sample households at baseline, 4.7 percent of children could not be re-interviewed in the 2006 
follow-up, and 3.1 percent in the 2008 follow-up. The low attrition rates are a result of repeat visits 
to recover temporary absence and extensive tracking of migrants. Migrant households and children 
were interviewed and tested in their new locations. 
Attrition is uncorrelated with treatment—in a regression of attrited households on a dummy 
for treatment, the coefficient is -0.004 in 2006 (with a standard error of .005), and 0.003 in 2008 
(with a standard error of 0.006). In a comparable regression for children the coefficient for 2006 is 
0.005, with a standard error of 0.013, and for 2008 the coefficient is 0.0004 with a standard error of 
0.009. Similar results are obtained when considering each of the treatment packages separately, and 
when comparing between treatment packages. Appendix Table A1 shows that the baseline 
characteristics of the full sample of households and those that could be located at follow-ups are 
very similar.  
Aside from attrition because of failure to re-interview, 6 percent of the children did not do 
one or more of the tests that rely on their active participation (Denver sub-scores, TVIP, memory, 
leg motor) in 2006. This was typically due to refusal to participate by extremely shy children, who 
were not willing to interact with the test administrators in a way that allowed the test to be 
conducted. This is of potential concern if the treatment affected the willingness of the children to 
participate. Appendix Table A2 shows that the baseline characteristics of children who did all tests   50 
are very similar to those of all children located at follow-up. The share of children who refused to 
take at least one test is lower in treated than in control communities in 2006, but the difference is 
not significant (the coefficient is 0.014 and the standard error 0.012). There are also no significant 
difference between the basic package and the lump sum payment package (coefficient -0.009, 
standard error 0.012).  
In addition, there are some other children for whom the full set of outcome variables is not 
available, either because of missing anthropometric measures, which was typically due to logistical 
problems with the anthropometric material (6 percent of children in 2006) or because the behavioral 
problem index is missing, typically because the caregiver could not be located by the test 
administrator (8 percent of children in 2006). There is no significant difference between treatment 
and control in the likelihood that the full set of outcome variables is available (the coefficient is 
0.014 and standard error 0.019).  
In 2008, field teams did more repeat visits and attempts to convince the children to 
participate in case of refusals and to recover missing information for anthropometrics or the 
behavioral index. As a result, the share of children who refused to participate in one or more tests is 
only 4 percent, and there is no significant difference between treatment and control communities 
(the coefficient is -0.003, and the standard error 0.009), nor between the basic and the lump-sum 
package (coefficient -0.004, standard error 0.009). Similarly, there are fewer children for whom 
anthropometric measures are missing (1 percent), or for whom the BPI is missing (an additional 4 
percent).  Here too there are no significant difference between treatment and control on the 
likelihood that the full set of outcome variables is available or not (the coefficient is as 0.004 and 
standard error 0.014). 
  Given that the differences between treatment and control are small and not significant, and 
given that we control for baseline differences, any resulting selection bias is likely to be small. This   51 
is further confirmed by a robustness check in which only the sample of children that have 
completed all the tests for their age group is used. The results from this robustness check are very 
similar to the main results we report—an average program effect of 0.08 standard deviations in 
2006 (0.1 standard deviations for cognitive-social emotional outcomes, and 0.05 for health and 
motor development) and an average program effect of 0.07 standard deviations in 2008 (0.08 
standard deviations for cognitive-social emotional outcomes and 0.07 for health and motor 
development).   52 
Appendix 3: Measurement of early childhood development tests and intermediate inputs 
 
Early childhood development tests 
  We focus on eleven measures of early childhood development. Height and weight were 
measured using standardized anthropometric material and procedures for all children. Height-for-
age and weight-for-age were calculated using the international norms.  
Social-personal, language, fine motor, and gross motor skills for children between 0 and 83 
months old were assessed using the four sub-tests of the Denver Developmental Screening Test 
(Frankenberg and Dodds 1996). For each subtest, the child is asked to perform a number of age-
specific tasks. When children fail to perform a task that 75 percent of children of their age in the 
reference population can perform, the test falls back to easier tasks, up to the point where tasks are 
reached that the child can perform.
29  In case certain behaviors or tasks cannot be observed, the 
caregiver is asked about the ability of the child to perform them. The social-personal subtest mainly 
consists of behavior that the caregiver is asked about, such as social interactions, the ability of a 
child to dress and eat on their own, imitate others, etc. The language subtest covers recognition and 
use of sounds, words, sentences, etc. The fine motor skills subtest mainly relates to observations of 
manual tasks such as drawing, playing with cubes, reaching for objects, etc. Finally, the gross motor 
tasks capture observations of basic crawling, sitting, walking, as well as throwing, jumping, etc. For 
the language, fine motor and gross motor subtests, most items are scored through direct observation 
of whether the child can perform the task. A relatively small share (15 out of 39 for language, 1 out 
of 29 for fine motor, and 5 out of 32 for gross motor) can be scored by asking the caregiver about 
the child’s ability for that specific task, in case the item cannot be directly observed. In the sample, 
40 (37) percent of language tests, 8 (4) percent of fine motor tests and 29 (23) percent of gross 
                                                 
29 Similarly, for children performing all tasks for their age group the test continues with more difficult tasks. For the 
children in our sample this occurred very rarely.   53 
motor tests have at least one item administered through the caregiver’s report in 2006 (2008). 
Importantly, neither in 2006 nor in 2008 is there a significant difference between treatment and 
control on the likelihood that the Denver items were obtained uniquely through direct observation, 
or in the number of items obtained through self-reporting (P-values of the significance tests range 
from 0.23 to 0.97). Hence, caregivers in the treatment are not more likely to provide answers on 
behalf of their children, further reducing concerns regarding potential differences in reporting. 
Moreover, as discussed in section 4, our findings are robust to excluding the Denver subtests from 
the estimations.  
The Denver scores are based on the number of tasks a child fails to perform, when these 
tasks can be carried out by more than 90 percent of children of the same age in the reference 
population.
30 The Denver is designed for children between 0 and 6 years of age. For this study, the 
test was also applied to somewhat older children, given the substantial delays in cognitive 
development that exist in our sample (described in detail in the paper).
31 For children age 36 months 
or older we applied five additional tests. The first of these is the TVIP, the Spanish-speaking 
version of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT), a test of receptive vocabulary that has 
been widely used in developed and developing countries.
32  Children are shown a series of slides 
with four pictures each (for example, the first slide has a picture of a flashlight, a boat, a basket, and 
a hot-air balloon), and are asked to point at a given object stated by the enumerator (for example, 
“boat”). Test items gradually become more difficult. The test administrator records the number of 
correct and incorrect responses, and the test stops when a child is making as many errors as she 
                                                 
30 The Denver has been used in other studies of early childhood development in developing countries, including in 
Nicaragua (Oberhelman et al. 1998). Other applications in developing countries include Halpern et al. (1996); Cheung 
et al. (2001); Choudhury and Gorman (2003); and Dewey et al (2001).  
31 Results are robust when only including the Denver test results for children up to 72 months of age (to reflect the age 
range the Denver was originally designed for). They are also robust to alternative ways of scoring the Denver test 
(accounting for the number of delays and cautions, or alternatively using a binary indicator on whether the child has at 
least one, or alternatively two, delays).  
32 See, for example, Paxson and Schady (2007, 2010), Schady (2011), Umbel et al. (1992), Baydar and Brooks-Gunn 
(1991), Blau and Grossberg (1992), Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994), and Fernald, Gertler, and Neufeld (2008).   54 
would be expected to make if she were randomly guessing.
33  We also use a short-term memory test 
and a leg motor test from the McCarthy test battery. In the memory test, the test administrator reads 
increasingly long sequences of numbers to the child, and asks the child to repeat them. The leg 
motor test measures the ability of children to execute six predetermined tasks—for example, 
walking on tiptoes or backwards, and standing on one foot.
34 In 2008 an associative memory test of 
the Woodcock-Muñoz test battery was also used.
35 In this test, children are introduced to an 
increasing number of space creatures with nonsensical names, and are asked to identify the different 
figures on a page that shows many of them at the same time. The final test we use is the Behavior 
Problem Index (BPI), which is based on the caregiver’s report of the frequency that a child displays 
each of 29 problematic behaviors, with responses coded as “never”, “sometimes” and “often”.
36  We 
use the number of behavioral problems for which a caregiver answers “often”. Unlike the other 
outcomes we study, behavioral problems do not necessarily indicate a delay, as there are no 
benchmarks or established ages at which they are predicted to decrease.
37 
Our analysis focuses on children below 6 years old when the transfers started. This means 
that all of them are below 7 years at the 2006 follow-up. The program requirement of primary 
school enrollment and attendance was binding for children age 7 and above. None of the children in 
our sample are bilingual—an obvious concern with tests that measure language ability. All of the 
tests were carefully pre-tested in the field and a handful of items that appeared to be culturally 
inappropriate were amended. The TVIP is standardized with a population of Mexican and Puerto 
                                                 
33 Before the test starts, the enumerator explains the test with the help of a few example slides. She proceeds to the 
actual test slides only once the child has demonstrated understanding of the test.  
34 See Stoltzfus et al. (2001), Gertler and Fernald (2004), Fernald, Gertler, and Neufeld (2008), and Cogill et al. (1986) 
for other applications. 
35 The associative memory tests was added for comparability with other studies on ECD outcomes in Latin American 
countries, in particular Paxson and Schady (2010), Schady (2011) and Fernald, Gertler, and Neufeld (2008). 
36 Recent applications of the BPI in Latin America include Fernald, Gertler, and Neufeld (2008); Paxson and Schady 
(2010). 
37 There is some overlap between the BPI and the social-personal behaviors measured in the Denver. For instance, the 
Denver personal-social subtest has a number of items that relate to social interactions; and the BPI also has questions 
about whether or how the child interacts with others.   55 
Rican children, and the words are all part of the vocabulary in Nicaragua. This was further verified 
during pre-testing.
38 In the case of the Denver test of language, there also does not appear to be an 
obvious concern with cultural appropriateness—the test measures whether infants can utter various 
sounds and, for older children, whether they can identify and name simple concepts, such as body 
parts. Additional evidence that the Denver is appropriate for our study population is provided by the 
fact that the national early childhood stimulation program in Nicaragua uses a slightly modified 
version of this test for child monitoring. For all these reasons, it seems unlikely that the observed 
delays are due to possible cultural inappropriateness of the tests for children we study. 
All tests were administered by a specially trained team of female-only test administrators. 
They were selected for their background (training as psychologists, social workers, or similar) and 
for their ability to establish good contact with small children. During the training, high emphasis 
was placed on gaining the confidence of the children before starting the test administration and on 
the standardized application of each of the tests. Moreover, data collection and test administration 
was organized in such a way that the test administrators would maintain a balance between the 
number of children visited in treatment and control communities, and visits to treatment and control 
were also balanced in time, to avoid any seasonal differences. Consistent with this approach, the 
results are robust to controls for the identity of the test administrator and for the month the tests was 
taken. 
 
Measurement of intermediate inputs 
                                                 
38 Paxson and Schady (2007) show that in rural Ecuador children whose mothers or fathers have completed secondary 
schooling have average scores that place them in the 50
th percentile of the test, indicating they perform as well as the 
international reference population, even if many others in the same setting also have very large delays. In our sample, 
only a very small number of parents (5.3 percent of mothers, and 4.5 percent of fathers) have completed secondary 
school, preventing us from carrying out a similar calculation. Nevertheless, it is telling that the results of the Denver 
reported in Oberhelman et al. (1998) for a Nicaraguan population that has much higher education levels show much 
smaller delays.    56 
As in most surveys, measures of input use are obtained by caregiver reports (for child food intake 
and stimulus indicators), or by reports by the household head or his spouse (for household food 
consumption and health indicators). Given the social marketing component of the intervention, this 
raises potential concern regarding reporting bias, as informants in the treatment could, in principle, 
be more likely to provide answers that they believe are socially desirable. The social marketing did 
not include messages on early childhood stimulation, making it less likely that we would observe 
reporting bias on those indicators. Also, while reporting error might be of concern for the 
measurement of other intermediate inputs during the intervention (in 2006), such concerns a priori 
seem to be much less for the results for 2008, when the intervention had concluded for 
approximately two years. Moreover, for at least one measure, the self-reported measures of growth 
check-ups, we can double-check the information using a vaccination-health use card filled in by 
health care providers when children visit the health center. Enumerators directly observed the 
presence of those cards. In 2006, the share of children with cards is higher in the treatment group, 
consistent with the fact that the health use cards are given to parents during growth check-ups. 
Among children with cards, however, there is no difference between treatment and control groups 
in the extent to which the information derived from the cards is consistent with answers provided by 
respondents in the interview. Hence, the finding that a higher share of children went to growth 
controls in the treatment is unlikely to be due to overreporting of desirable behavior by treatment 
parents.  For 2008, children in the treatment are no longer more likely to be weighed and, 
consistently, they are also no longer significantly more likely to have vaccination-health use cards. 
In 2008, too, the level of concordance between parental reports and the cards is not different 
between treatment and control groups. 
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